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PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW UNDER THE FEDERAL
ARBITRATION ACT
The Federal Arbitration Act, in contrast to common law, makes
arbitration agreements in contracts "evidencing a transaction involving commerce" valid and enforceable. Recent decisions of
the United States Supreme Court mandate that the federal Act
be applied in both federal and state courts. In this comment, the
author traces the history of the federal Act and addresses the
threshold question of what activities satisfy the commerce requirement. The author examines the inconsistencies that arise
when the federal Act is applied in state courts and urges Congress to revise the Act in light of these inconsistencies. Finally,
potential changes in Maryland commercial arbitration law are
explored.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Although most commentaries on the modern day litigation explosion focus on the number of cases resolved in the courts, I a large number
of disputes now are resolved in the hearing rooms of arbitrators. 2 Consequently, several recent United States Supreme Court decisions have construed the law of commercial arbitration. 3 In Southland Corp. v.
I. See Van Dusen, Comments on the Volume of Litigation in the Federal Courts, 8
DEL. J. CORP. L. 435 (1983) (discussing the effect of the litigation explosion on the
judicial system); Coleman, The Supreme Court of the United States: Managing Its
Caseload to Achieve Its Constitutional Purposes, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1983) (discussing the effect of the litigation explosion on the Supreme Court).
During the twelve month period ending June 30, 1984, there were 261,485 civil
cases filed in United States district courts. THE LA WYERS ALMANAC 698 (1985)
(Law & Business, Inc.!Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers). It is estimated that
only two percent of all civil litigation in the United States is in the federal courts.
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15 n.8 (1984).
2. There were almost 40,000 commercial, labor, accident, and construction cases filed
with the American Arbitration Association in 1984. The Arbitration Alternative, 71
A.B.A.J. 78, 79 (Feb. 1985). The number of commercial and labor cases arbitrated
has more than doubled in the past decade. !d. Arbitration has been defined as:
[A] contractual proceeding, whereby the parties to any controversy or dispute, in order to obtain an inexpensive and speedy final disposition of the
matter involved, select judges of their own choice and by consent submit
their controversy to such judges for determination, in place of the tribunals provided by the ordinary processes of law.
M. DOMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 1.01 (1984) (citing Gates v. Arizona
Brewing Co., 54 Ariz. 266, 269, 95 P.2d 49, 50 (1930)).
For a discussion of court-annexed, as opposed to private arbitration, see Snow
& Abramson, Alternative to Litigation: Court-Annexed Arbitation, 20 CAL. W.L.
REV. 43 (1983).
3. During the eleven month period between February, 1983 and January, 1984, two
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States construed the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982) (Act or federal Act). These were Southland
Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) and Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983). Prior to these decisions the Court had not
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Keating,4 and Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction
Corp. ,5 the Court explicitly reinforced a judicial policy promoting the
enforcement of arbitration agreements. It is clear that both the high cost
of litigation and the burden on the courts resulting from the high volume
of litigation have played a crucial role in these decisions. 6
Although state law governs most contract issues, 7 the Supreme
Court's recent decisions have summarily mandated that the Federal Arbitration ActS (Act or federal Act) is to be applied in state as well as
federal court proceedings for the enforcement of arbitration agreements. 9
This comment will explore the development of the Act since its inception
as a procedural device in 1925, through its post-Erie classification as
"substantive," and will address a number of inconsistencies that have
arisen when the Act is applied in state courts. This comment encourages
Congress to revise the Act in light of these inconsistencies and addresses
the threshold question to be met when considering the Act's applicability
in state courts - whether interstate commerce is involved. Finally, potential changes in Maryland commercial arbitration law will be
examined.
II.

BACKGROUND

A.

Response to the Unenforceability of Arbitration Agreements Federal Arbitration Act

The

At common law, a majority of courts found agreements to arbitrate
contrary to public policy, void, and unenforceable. \0 This doctrine was
based largely upon two characteristics - jealousy and the quest for prestige. 11 These characteristics pervaded the courts and resulted in judicial
decisions calculated to dispel the threat that arbitration imposed upon
the scope of the courts' jurisdiction. 12

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

11.
12.

been faced with an issue of interpretation of the federal Act since Prima Paint Corp.
v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
465 U.S. 1 (1984).
460 U.S. 1 (1983).
See The Arbitration Alternative, 71 A.B.A.I. 78 (1985).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (1971).
9 U.S.c. §§ 1-14 (1982).
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. I, 14-15 (1984); Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,24 (1983) (dicta).
See W. STURGES, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND AWARDS §§ 22-23 (1930).
For a review of the reasons advanced at common law for refusing to enforce arbitration agreements, see United States Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 F. 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).
Although at common law an agreement to arbitrate a future dispute was voidable, a party who was aggrievied by a breach of this agreement could maintain an
action for damages suffered as a result of the breach. These damages, however, were
usually nominal. Typically, a court refused to exercise its equity power to enforce an
agreement, recognizing the parties freedom to arbitrate if both were agreeable. See
W. STURGES, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND AWARDS §§ 22-23 (1930).
See W. STURGES, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND AWARDS § 15 & n.4 (1930).
Dicta in a decision by Lord Coke, Vynior's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 595 (K.B. 1609), is
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Although prior to the enactment of the federal Act some state
courts displayed a willingness to enforce arbitration agreements,I3 the
federal courts remained steadfastly opposed. 14 This dichotomy presented
a conflict for the federal courts, which on the one hand sought to follow
federal decisional law,ls and on the other were faced with the Rules of
Decision Act which required that the "laws of the several states . . . be
regarded as rules of decision . . . . "16 A number of federal courts held
arbitration agreements unenforceable as a matter of general federallaw,I7
perhaps relying on the language of the Supreme Court's Swift v. Tyson 18
decision, which interpreted the Rules of Decision Act not to require application of state law on issues of "general law."19
In 1925, the Federal Arbitration Act was enacted. 20 Section 2 of the

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.
18.
19.

20.

credited with initiating the idea that arbitration is disfavored because it "ousts" the
court of its jurisdiction. See W. STURGES, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND
AWARDS § 15 n.3 (1930); Comment, Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts Under the
United States Arbitration Act, 27 TEX. L. REV. 218, 218 n.4 (1948).
See, e.g., Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlsberger, Inc., 230 N.Y. 261, 130 N.E. 288
(1921) (executory agreement to arbitrate valid and enforceable under New York
law); ZindorfConstr. Co. v. Western Am. Co., 27 Wash. 31, 67 P.374 (1901) (executory agreement to arbitrate precludes action at law); Monongahela Navigation Co.
v. Fenlon, 4 Watts & Sergo 205 (Pa. 1842) (engineer's expertise warrants validity of
arbitration agreement in construction contract).
See Haskell V. McClintic-Marshall Co., 289 F. 405 (9th Cir. 1923); Jefferson Fire
Ins. CO. V. Bierce & Sage, Inc., 183 F. 588 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1910); Mitchell V.
Dougherty, 90 F. 639 (3d Cir. 1898); Tobey V. County of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313
(C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 14,065); Lappe V. Wilcox, 14 F.2d 861 (N.D.N.Y. 1926);
U.S. Asphalt Ref. CO. V. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 F. 1006 (S.D.N.Y.
1915).
See supra note 14. The reason for the federal courts' desire to follow federal decisionallaw is unclear. One commentator has stated that the purpose was to establish
nationwide uniformity of decision. See Kochery, The Enforcement of Arbitration
Agreements in the Federal Courts: Erie V. Tompkins, 39 CORNELL L.Q. 74, 80
(1953). Because none of the federal cases actually discuss the choice of law issue at
length, it is likely that the federal courts simply saw invalidation of arbitration
agreements as the better rule. See generally R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS
LAW § 110 (rev. ed. 1968) (discussing the "better rule" as a basis for choice of law);
R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6.27 (2d ed. 1980)
(same).
28 U.S.c. § 1652 (1982) (corresponds to judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34,1 Stat.
73, 92); see infra note 19 (discussing commentary on courts' failure to apply the
Rules of Decision Act).
See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
/d. at 18. None of the cases specifically discuss the issue of the applicability of the
Rules of Decision Act as interpreted by Swift V. Tyson. See supra note 14. Several
commentators, however, have discussed the issue. See Kochery, supra note 15, at
78; Note, Commercial Arbitration in Federal Courts, 20 V AN. L. REV. 607, 612
(1967). For an early commentary questioning the propriety of the federal courts in
ignoring the Rules of Decision Act, see Federal Courts - Authority of State LawRefusal to Apply New York Arbitration Law, 40 HARV. L. REV. 649 (1926-27).
Act of Feb. 12, 1925, ch. 213,43 Stat. 883. Section 14 of the original version named
the Act the United States Arbitration act. 9 U.S.c. § 14 (1946). In 1947, however,
section 14 was repealed. Act of July 30, 1947, ch. 392, § 2, 61 Stat. 669. The Act
has since been referred to as both the United States Arbitration Act and the Federal
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Act holds valid and irrevocable those agreements to arbitrate based on a
"written provision in . . . a contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce."21 Section 3 provided for a stay of judicial proceedings pending arbitration,22 and section 4 provided for specific performance of an
agreement to arbitrate. 23
The Act did little to settle the choice of law issues confronting the
federal courts. The focus of attention turned to whether the requirement
of interstate commerce set forth in section 2 was similarly required to
invoke the other provisions of the Act. 24 Neither section 3 nor section 4
mentioned the commerce requirement. The one Supreme Court decision
construing the Act during this period, Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus,25
found its jurisdictional basis in admiralty, thereby shedding no light on
the subject.2 6 This decision was important, however, because it characterized arbitration as a procedural device under the federal Act. 27
Absent guidance from the Supreme Court, a majority of the lower
federal courts interpreted the language of section 2 to require interstate
commerce, in addition to the usual jurisdictional prerequisites of amount
in controversy and diversity, before any provisions of the new Act would

21.

22.

23.

24.
25.
26.
27.

Arbitration Act. The early legislative history of the Act is traced in Sturges & Murphy, Some Confusing Matters Relating to Arbitration Under the United States Arbitration Act, 17 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 580, 580 n.l (1952).
9 U.S.c. § 2 (1982) (corresponds to United States Arbitration Act of 1925, ch. 213,
§ 2, 43 Stat. 883). Section 2 provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, of an agreement in writing to submit
to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
9 U.S.c. § 3 (1982) (corresponds to United States Arbitration Act of 1925, ch. 213,
§ 3, 43 Stat. 883). Section 3 provides:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United
States upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon
being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such agreement, shall on application of one of the
parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in
accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for
the stay is not in default in proceedings with such arbitration.
9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982).
9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982) (corresponds to United States Arbitration Act of 1925, ch. 213,
§ 4, 43 Stat. 883). Section 4 provides in pertinent part: "[A] party aggrieved by the
alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a written agreement
for arbitration may petition any United States district court . . . for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement." 9 U.S.c. § 4 (1982).
See infra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
284 U.S. 263 (1932).
See id. at 272.
See id. at 277-78.
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apply.28 Hence, lack of interstate commerce in federal diversity actions
often precluded application of the federal Act. 29 Furthermore, state arbitration law was similarly inapplicable on the theory that arbitration was
a procedural device,30 and under accepted conflicts rules, procedural issues were to be governed by the law of the forum. 31

B.

The Erie Doctrine -

Is Arbitration Substance or Procedure?

The Supreme Court's landmark decision, Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins,32 did little to clear up the confusion regarding the jurisdictional scope of the new federal Act. Instead, it created another question
- whether the Act would still be considered procedural - and undermined the rationale of those prior federal court decisions that had determined arbitration to be "general federal law" in diversity cases. 33 The
Erie doctrine mandates the application of state substantive law in federal
diversity suits. In light of this, the Supreme Court's characterization of
arbitration as procedural for all purposes in Marine Transit 34 became the
subject of criticism. Commentators argued that some provisions of the
Act were procedural, but that other provisions were undoubtedly substantive and should be treated as such for choice of law purposes. 3S
The development of the "outcome determinative" test by the
Supreme Court in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York 36 redefined the scope of
the purely objective substance/procedure test contemplated by Erie. In
Guaranty Trust, the Court declared that "the intent of [Erie] was to in28. See, e.g., Krauss Bros. Lumber Co. v. Bossert & Sons, 62 F.2d 1004 (2d Cir. 1933);
In re Woerner, 31 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1929); Zip Mfg. Co. v. Pep Mfg. Co., 44 F.2d
184 (D. Del. 1930); see also Note, Arbitration Law of the Last Decade, 26 VA. L.
REV. 327, 340-41 (1940) (discussing jurisdictional prerequisites for application of
the federal Act).
29. See In re Cold Metal Process Co., 9 F. Supp. 992 (W.D. Pa. 1935); The Volsinio, 32
F.2d 357 (E.D.N.Y. 1929).
30. See California Prune & Apricot Growers Ass'n v. Catz Am. Co., 60 F.2d 788, 790
(9th Cir. 1932) (plaintiff's action in federal court to invoke state arbitration statute
denied); Lappe v. Wilcox, 14 F.2d 861 (N.D.N.Y. 1926) (state arbitration act is
procedural, not substantive and therefore is not binding on the federal courts).
31. See Hyde v. Stone, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 170, 175 (1857); Union Bank v. Jolly's
Adm'rs, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 503, 507 (1855); Suydam v. Broadnax, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.)
67, 75 (1840); Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) I (1825); 2 J. BEALE,
CONFLICT OF LAWS 1247-48 (1935).
32. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
33. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. According to Erie, "[t]here is no general
federal common law." Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
34. Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284 U.S. 263, 277-78 (1932). The Supreme Court
had characterized arbitration as procedural as early as 1864 in Heckers v. Fowler,
69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 123 (1864), where a judgment entered by a clerk of the court upon
the report of an arbitrator was held valid and enforceable. Prior to the enactment of
the federal Act, the Court reaffirmed this characterization in Red Cross Line v.
Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109 (1924).
35. See Kochery, supra note 15, at 77-78; Heilman, Arbitration Agreements and the Conflict of Laws, 38 YALE L.J. 617, 617-18 (1929).
36. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
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sure that in all cases where a federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely
because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties, the outcome of the
litigation in the federal court should be substantially the same. . . as it
would be if tried in a State court."37 Thus, the stage was set for a virtual
emasculation of the federal Act.
In view of the language in Guaranty Trust, one would expect that in
a diversity action where state law would not enforce an arbitration agreement, a federal court would be forced to ignore the federal Act. Thus,
the federal Act would be precluded in any diversity action where state
law considered arbitration unenforceable. 38 The few cases addressing
this issue in the wake of Guaranty Trust, however, reached the opposite
concl usion. 39
For a clear understanding of these cases, attention must first be directed to the distinction between viewing the Act as "substantive" under
Erie and viewing the Act as "federal substantive law." The former requires deference to state law in federal courts; the latter relies upon an
exercise of Congressional power as justification for the application of federal law in federal courts, regardless of conflicting state laws. 40
In Jackson v. Kentucky River Mills,41 the federal district court conspicuously avoided Guaranty Trust and held that, "legislating within its
constitutional domain, Congress has declared, as a matter of substantive
law, that an arbitration agreement . . . is valid and enforceable."42 Similarly, in Local 19 Warehouse Union v. Buckeye Cotton Oil Co. ,43 applying
the federal Act to a labor contract, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit recognized that the Act creates federal rights in arbitration and
37. /d. at 109.
38. See Note, Erie, Bernhardt, and Section 2 of the United States Arbitration Act: A
Farrago of Rights. Remedies. and A Right to A Remedy, 69 YALE L.J. 847, 847-48
(1959-60) [hereinafter cited as Erie, Bernhardt and Section 2]; Robert Lawrence Co.
v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 404-05 (2d Cir. 1959).
39. See infra notes 41-44 and accompanying text. But see Tejas Dev. Co. v. McGough
Bros., 165 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1947).
40. Compare Tejas Dev. Co. v. McGough Bros., 165 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1947) (arbitration is substantive for Erie purposes, therefore state law prevails) with Local 19
Warehouse Union v. Buckeye Cotton Oil Co., 236 F.2d 776 (6th Cir. 1956) (federal
Act creates federal rights in arbitration) and Jackson v. Kentucky River Mills, 65 F.
Supp. 601 (E.D. Ky. 1946) (arbitration is a matter of federal substantive law).
In Tejas, the court intimated that section 2 of the federal Act was inapplicable
because the contract was not one of interstate commerce. However, in response to
an argument that the enforcement sections of the Act, sections 3 and 4, applied
despite the absence of commerce, the court stated that the question was "not as to
the method of enforcement of a valid award, but of the validity of the awards and
the binding effect of the agreement to arbitrate, both of which are matters of state
substantive law." Tejas Dev. Co. v. McGough Bros., 165 F.2d 276, 278-79 (5th Cir.
1947) (emphasis added). Citing Erie, the court held that because arbitration was
state substantive law, the outcome of the suit "can become no better by going into
Federal court. . . than . . . in State Courts." [d.
41. 65 F. Supp. 601 (E.D. Ky. 1946), a./f'd, 206 F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1953).
42. /d. at 603.
43. 236 F.2d 776 (6th Cir. 1956).
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held that state law does not control. 44 These cases posed the question
whether, in light of Erie's prohibition of general federal common law, the
federal courts constitutionally could apply the federal Act as a matter of
federal substantive law. 45 Although not addressed therein, this constitutional question was also recognized by the Supreme Court in Bernhardt
v. Polygraphic Co. of America. 46

C.

Arbitration as Substantive Federal Law

In Bernhardt, the Supreme Court considered whether section 3 of
the federal Act, providing for a stay of judicial proceedings pending arbitration, could be applied in a federal diversity suit absent a transaction
involving commerce. 47 The plaintiff brought a breach of contract action
in a Vermont state court. Realizing that the contract's arbitration agreement would not be enforced under Vermont law, the defendant sought
removal to federal district court and, once therein, a stay of court proceedings pending arbitration in accordance with section 3 of the federal
Act. 48
The district court refused to grant the stay, relying on the Guaranty
Trust "outcome determinative" test and the treatment of arbitration
agreements under Vermont law as unenforceable. 49 The court of appeals
reversed, holding that commerce was required to invoke only section 2 of
the Act, and that Erie warranted application of section 3 in federal courts
solely as a matter of procedure. 50 The Supreme Court, however, disagreed. The Court held that because "[s]ections 1, 2, and 3 are integral
parts of a whole,"51 the jurisdictional provisions of section 2 are similarly
applicable to section 3. Because the contract in Bernhardt was not one
involving commerce, section 3 was inapplicable, and Vermont law
44. /d. at 781.
45. See Erie, Bernhardt and Section 2, supra note 38, at 848-49.
46. 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
47.Id.
48. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 122 F. Supp. 733, 733-34 (D. Vt. 1954), rev'd,
218 F.2d 948 (2d Cir. 1955), rev'd, 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
49. Id. at 734-35.
50. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 218 F.2d 948,951 (2d Cir. 1955), rev'd, 350
U.S. 198 (1956). Although, prior to Erie, a majority of lower federal courts required
interstate commerce before application of any of the Act's provisions, see supra note
28 and accompanying text, several later decisions found section 3 applicable
notwithstanding an absence of commerce. See, e.g., Agostini Bros. Bldg. Corp. v.
United States, 142 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1944); Donahue v. Susquehanna Collieries
Co., 138 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1943); Wilson & Co. v. Freemont Cake & Meal Co., 77 F.
Supp. 364 (D.C. Neb. 1948). Most courts, however, continued to require the presence of commerce before application of section 4. See, e.g., W.R. Grimshaw Co. v.
Nazareth Literary & Benevolent Inst., 113 F. Supp. 564 (E.D. Ark. 1953);
Freemont Cake & Meal Co. v. Wilson & Co., 86 F. Supp. 968 (D. Neb. 1949), affd,
183 F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1950); San Carlo Opera Co. v. Conley, 72 F. Supp. 825
(S.D.N. Y. 1946).
51. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 201 (1956).
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prevailed. 52
In response to the argument that section 3 was applicable in all federal cases as a matter of federal procedural law, the Court held that the
Act was substantive, not procedural, for Erie purposes. 53 This, however,
gave rise to a serious constitutional question: Was the Act an unconstitutional infringement upon the right of state courts to formulate the law
that is followed in federal diversity cases?54 Although Bernhardt raised
this question, it was left unanswered. 55
Soon thereafter, this same question was addressed by the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire
Fabrics, Inc. 56 In this diversity action, the plaintiff, Robert Lawrence
Co., sought damages for fraudulent misrepresentations made by the defendant, Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., in inducing the purchase of a quantity
of wool. Pursuant to an arbitration agreement in the contract, Devonshire Fabrics, Inc. moved for a stay of court proceedings pending arbitration in accordance with section 3 of the federal Act. 57 The contract was
one evidencing a transaction involving commerce. 58 The New York fed52. Id. at 200-02.
53. See id. at 202-03.
54. Id. at 202. "If respondent's contention is correct, a constitutional question might be
presented." /d. Justice Frankfurter offered this answer: "[S]ince the United States
Arbitration Act of 1925 does not obviously apply to diversity cases . . . [the majority's] avoidance of the constitutional question is for me sufficiently compelling to
lead to a construction of the Act as not applicable to diversity cases." Id. at 208
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
55. Although the Court granted certiorari in Bernhardt "because of the doubtful application by the Court of Appeals of Erie," Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 200, the issue was
avoided. The Court stated: "Our view is that § 3, so read, would invade the local
law field. We therefore read § 3 narrowly to avoid that issue." Bernhardt, 350 U.S.
at 202.
Applying the "checklist theory" of the tenth amendment, Professor Ely has
stated that the Bernhardt Court's reference to the federal Act's invasion of the "local law field" was misplaced: "But in suggesting that as a matter of constitutional
law restrictive of Acts of Congress, a 'local law field' limits the federal government's
exercise of powers no one doubts it has. . . the Bernhardt court sowed only needless confusion." Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 706
(1974).
Post-Erie federal common law regarding arbitration is also authorized by the
Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, construed in Textile Workers v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). In Lincoln Mills, the Court concluded that Congress, in
furthering a policy of industrial peace, authorizes "federal courts to fashion a body
of federal law for . . . specific performance of promises to arbitrate grievances
under collective bargaining agreements." Id. at 451.
See generally, Friendly, In Praise of Erie - And of the New Federal Common
Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 383 (1964) (discussing the post-Erie growth of federal common law); Hill, The Law Making Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional Preemption, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1024 (1967) (same); Bourne, Federal Common Law
and the Erie-Byrd Rule, 12 U. BALT. L. REV. 426 (1983) (same).
56. 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 909, cert. dismissed, 364 U.S.
801 (1960).
57. See id. at 403-04.
58. Id. at 409.
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eral district court denied the stay, relying on New York state law which
permitted only a court, not an arbitrator, to decide the issue of fraud in
the inducement of a container contract,59 i. e., a contract that contains an
arbitration agreement. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc. appealed to the Second
Circuit.60
The decision whether a court or an arbitrator should decide the validity of the arbitration agreement was potentially outcome determinative, raising a presumption that under Erie and its progeny state law
must be followed. 61 Judge Medina, however, writing for the Second Circuit, relied largely on legislative history and policy considerations to conclude that the federal Act created a body of federal substantive law
affecting the validity and interpretation of arbitration agreements. 62 To
hold otherwise, he feared, would emasculate the Act by rendering it inapplicable in diversity cases. 63 He reasoned that in enacting the Act, Congress intended to exercise its commerce and admiralty powers to remove
the common law hostility toward arbitration. 64 Because the contract in
Robert Lawrence involved commerce, the federal Act applied in lieu of
New York state law. 65
The Second Circuit determined that under the federal Act, unlike
under New York law, an agreement to arbitrate is separable from the
container contract, and therefore an allegation of fraud must be directed
to the arbitration agreement itself before the agreement is deemed void. 66
This determination was based not only upon the Act's language, but also
upon policy considerations and the common law treatment of arbitration
agreements as separable. 67 The court reasoned that the reference in section 2 to a specific "written provision" and the reference in section 3 to
an "agreement in writing" for arbitration suggests a distinction between
59. Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402,404,412 (2d Cir.
1959). The rationale behind refusal to send the fraud issue to arbitration is that a
container contract and the agreement to arbitrate within are inseparable; therefore
an allegation of fraud in the making of a container contract is similarly an allegation
of fraud in the making of the agreement to arbitrate. See Wrap Vertiser Corp. v.
Plotnick, 3 N.Y.2d 17, 143 N.E.2d 366, 163 N.Y.S.2d 639 (1957) (overruled in
Weinrott v. Carp, 32 N.Y.2d 190,298 N.E.2d 42, 344 N.Y.S.2d 848 (1973»; Manufacturers Chemical Co. v. Caswell Strauss & Co., 259 A.D. 321, 19 N.Y.S.2d 171
(1940); see also, Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 41216 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting) (arbitration of fraud issue raises questions of due
process); George Engine Co. v. Southern Shipbuilding Corp., 350 So. 2d 881, 885
(La. 1977), ajJ'd on remand, 376 So. 2d 1041 (La. Ct. App. 1979) (arbitration of
fraud issue denies rights to jury trial and appeal); Note, Federal Arbitration Act and
Application of the "Separability Doctrine" in Federal Courts, 1968 DUKE L.J. 588
( 1968) (discussing rationale of separability).
60. Robert Lawrence, 271 F.2d at 402.
61. Id. at 404-05.
62. Id. at 406.
63. Id. at 404.
64. Id. at 406-07.
65. Id. at 409.
66. Id. at 411.
67. !d. at 409-10.
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the container contract and the arbitration agreement. 68 Recognizing the
tenuous nature of relying solely on this reasoning, the court buttressed its
argument with the historical separability of arbitration agreements. 69 In
addition, the court resorted to the Act's "liberal policy of promoting arbitration"?O in arriving at its conclusion that the arbitration agreement
was separable from the container contract.
Because federal jurisdiction in Robert Lawrence was based on diversity, and therefore the parties had access to either state or federal court,
the Second Circuit saw fit to reconcile the Erie question posed by the
potential inconsistency of decisions in the two forums.?! Relying on the
text and legislative history of the Act,72 the court reconciled the Erie
question by holding the federal Act applicable in both forums provided
the underlying contract was one of admiralty or interstate commerce. If
the federal Act is applicable in both federal and state courts as a matter
of federal substantive law, there is no potential for inconsistent decisions;
hence, the Erie question is answered. 73
Eight years after Judge Medina's reconciliation, the Supreme Court
decided Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co., 74 a
case with facts 75 virtually identical to those in Robert Lawrence.
Although the Supreme Court agreed with Robert Lawrence in its conclusions on the issues of separability76 and the Act's reliance on Congress's
68.Id.
69. !d. at 410. At common law, however, the primary impetus for viewing an arbitration agreement as separable from its container contract was to guarantee the legitimacy of the container contract while invalidating the arbitration agreement within.
Id.
70. Id. "Finally, any doubts as to the construction of the Act ought to be resolved in
line with its liberal policy of promoting arbitration both to accord with the original
intention of the parties and to help ease the current congestion of court calendars."
Id.
71. Id. Robert Lawrence, Inc. was a Massachusetts corporation and Devonshire
Fabrics, Inc. was a New York corporation. Id. at 404. If the suit had been brought
in a New York state court, the arbitration agreement would not have been enforced.
See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text. Hence, the constitutional question
raised in Bernhardt faced the court in Robert Lawrence. Robert Lawrence, 271 F.2d
at 404.
72. Robert Lawrence, 271 F.2d at 406-07.
73. Id. at 407. Judge Medina wrote: "This is a declaration of national law equally
applicable in state or federal courts." Id. Hence, there was no question of constitutional law under Erie. Id. at 404-05.
74. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
75. Prima Paint Corp., a Maryland corporation, entered into a contract for consulting
services with Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co., a New Jersey corporation. The
contract contained an arbitration clause. After breach, Prima Paint Corp. alleged
that Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co. had fraudulently represented its solvency.
Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co. served notice of intention to arbitrate. Prima
Paint Corp. responded by filing a diversity action in federal court for rescission of
the consulting agreement on the basis of fraudulent inducement, and on the same
grounds, petitioned the court for an order enjoining arbitration. Id. at 397-99.
76. Id. at 402-04.
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commerce powers,77 a comparison of the two decisions reveals several
subtle differences in reasoning. 78 The most obvious difference was the
absence of consideration by the Prima Paint Court of the Erie question
posed by potential inconsistent decisions in state and federal forums. 79
Whereas the Robert Lawrence court recognized and dealt with this question by asserting that the federal Act was applicable in both forums,80 the
Prima Paint majority ignored it. 8!
Although Justice Black argued in dissent that the Prima Paint majority had construed too broadly the language of the federal Act,82 a
comparison of Robert Lawrence and Prima Paint reveals a greater reluctance by the Supreme Court to stray from a strict interpretation of the
statute. 83 Judge Medina of the Second Circuit relied on policy and historical considerations when fashioning the rule on separability in Robert
Lawrence;84 the Prima Paint Court found the same rule mandated solely
by the language of section 4. 85 The Court held that section 4, which
orders a federal court to compel arbitration "once it is satisfied that the
'making of the agreement for arbitration. . . is not in issue,' " requires
the party alleging fraud to direct that allegation expressly to the agreement to arbitrate in order to void that agreement. 86
The method employed by the Supreme Court in dealing with the
77. Id. at 400-01.
78. See Aksen, Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin - What Does It Mean?, 43 ST. JOHNS
L. REV. 1, 19-21 (1968). After reviewing Robert Lawrence, the Court stated: "We
agree, albeit for somewhat different reasons . . . . " Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood &
Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395,400 (1967).
79. Although the majority did not mention the increased potential for forum shopping,
it did answer the constitutional question left open in Bernhardt - whether the Arbitration Act could be enforced as a matter of federal substantive law in diversity
cases. The Court stated:
The question in this case, however, is not whether Congress may fashion
federal substantive rules to govern questions arising in simple diversity
cases [but rather] whether Congress may prescribe how federal courts are
to conduct themselves with respect to subject matter over which Congress
plainly has power to legislate. The answer to that can only be in the
affirmative.
Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 405.
80. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
81. Based on the Court's avoidance of this critical issue, and the opinion's abundance of
directives aimed specifically at the federal courts, at least one commentator theorized that Prima Paint was calculated to convey that the federal Act was not applicable in state courts. See Aksen, supra note 78, at 22-23.
82. Cj. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 409 (Black, J., dissenting) (Court's holding is not supported by the language or legislative history of the federal Act); id. at 410 (Black, J.,
dissenting) (language of section 4, considered alone, does not, as the majority held,
provide an explicit answer to the separability question); id. at 416 (Black, J., dissenting) (Court's departure from Act's clear statement); id. at 425 (Black, J., dissenting)
(Congress, not the Court, may revise the federal Act).
83. See Aksen, supra note 78, at 19-21.
84. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
85. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 403 (section 4 provides the "explicit answer" to the separability question).
86. Id. at 403-04.
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constitutional question posed by the application of federal substantive
law in diversity cases similarly displayed the Court's eagerness to base its
decision on the Act itself.87 Whereas the rationale in Robert Lawrence
had been supported by legislative history and policy considerations,88 the
Prima Paint Court again based its decision on the language of the statute:
"It is clear beyond dispute that the federal arbitration statute is based
upon and confined to the incontestable Federal foundations of 'control
over interstate commerce and over admiralty.' "89 Hence, it appears that
the Supreme Court was striving to reach Judge Medina's result in Robert
Lawrence in a manner less likely to be criticized as judicial revisionism. 90
III.

A.

RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS: ABSENCE
OF STATUTORY GUIDELINES FUELS
A POLICY APPROACH
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury
Construction Corp.

The Court was unable to adhere to the narrow statutory approach
undertaken in Prima Paint when it was faced with less conspicuous arbitration issues sixteen years later in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v.
Mercury Construction Corp. ,91 a case involving a construction contract
dispute. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital (Hospital) entered into a
contract with Mercury Construction Corp. (Mercury) for the construction of additions to its hospital building. The contract provided that all
disputes involving interpretation of the contract or performance of the
construction work were initially to be referred to the project architect.
All matters decided by the architect, or those not decided within a specified time, could then be submitted to binding arbitration. 92
Construction of the project began in July, 1975, and was to be completed by October, 1979. At a meeting in October, 1977, attended by
representatives of Mercury, the Hospital, and the architect, Mercury
agreed to comply with the architect's request to withhold its claims for
delay and impact costs until the work was substantially completed. 93
Substantial completion occurred in February, 1979, and Mercury submitted its claims to the architect in January, 1980. 94 After ten months of
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Aksen, supra note 78, at 20.
See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 405.
See Aksen, supra note 78, at 21.
460 U.S. I (1983).
[d. at 4-5. The arbitration clause was Article 7.10 of A.I.A. (American Institute of
Architects) Document A201, General Conditions of the Contract for Construction
(1967 ed.). Ness, Moses Cone Hospital v. Mercury Construction and the Enforcement of Construction Contract Arbitration Clauses, CONSTR. LAW., Spring 1983, at
3,7 n.2.
93. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,6 (1983).
94. /d. at 5-6.

1985]

Preemption under the Federal Arbitration Act

141

deliberation, the Hospital informed Mercury that it would pay nothing
on the claims and filed a declaratory judgment action in North Carolina
state court naming both Mercury and the architect as defendants. The
Hospital alleged that Mercury had lost its right to arbitrate due to
waiver, laches, estoppel, and failure to make a timely demand for
arbitration. 95
Mercury responded by filing a diversity suit in federal district court
seeking an order to compel arbitration under section 4 of the federal Act.
On the Hospital's motion, the district court stayed Mercury's federal suit
pending resolution of the state action because both involved the identical
issue of the arbitrability of Mercury's claims. 96 Mercury's appeal to the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit resulted in reversal of the district court's stay order and remand to the district court with instructions
for entry of an order to arbitrate. 97
The Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit's order to arbitrate. 98 The question presented on appeal was not one of arbitration, but
rather whether the district court properly stayed the federal action pending resolution of the parallel state court litigation. 99 In resolving this
issue, the Court relied on Colorado River Water Conservation District v.
United States, 100 which held that once federal jurisdiction is properly invoked, deference to parallel state court litigation is proper only in "exceptional circumstances." 101 In determining whether "exceptional
circumstances" are present, Colorado River set forth a number of factors
to be considered, including the avoidance of "piecemeal litigation" and
the order in which jurisdiction was obtained by the two forums. 102 Ap95. Id. at 7.
96.Id.
97. Mercury Constr. Corp. v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 656 F.2d 933 (4th Cir.
1981), affd, 460 U.S. I (1983).
98. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. I (1983).
99. Id. at 4, 13.
100. 424 U.S. 800 (1976). Colorado River involved the exercise of federal court jurisdiction to adjudicate federal water rights. The McCarran Amendment, 43 U.S.c.
§ 666, waives sovereign immunity to permit joinder of the United States in some
state-court suits for the adjudication of water rights. In Colorado River, the government brought suit in federal district court against some 1,000 non-federal water
users, seeking a declaration of the water rights of several Indian tribes and governmental entities. A defendant in the federal court suit sought to join the United
States in a state court proceeding to adjudicate all of the Unites States's claims in
state court pursuant to the McCarran Amendment. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
!OJ. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 813 (quoting County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda
Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188-89 (1959».
102. In Colorado River, the Court mentioned four factors: (I) the assumption by either
court of jurisdiction over any res or property; (2) the inconvenience of the federal
forum; (3) the desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation; and (4) the order in
which jurisdiction was obtained by the concurrent forums. Colorado River, 424
U.S. at 818-19. A decision to dismiss a federal action because of a parallel statecourt action is not made on the basis of mechanical application of the Colorado
River factors, but rather on a careful balancing of the factors as applied to a given

142

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 15

plying these factors in Moses H. Cone, the Court found no showing of the
requisite exceptional circumstances to justify the district court's stay. \03
The Court first considered the potential for piecemeal litigation. I04
In its attempt to avoid arbitration, the Hospital argued that, if it were
forced to arbitrate, it would be subject to duplicative proceedings - one
with Mercury concerning its claim for delay and impact costs, and the
other with the architect concerning the Hospital's indemnity claim.
Although the former was within the purview of the arbitration agreement, the latter was not. \05 The Hospital's tactic of joining a defendant
not subject to an arbitration agreement is commonly used to further complicate a dispute in an attempt to avoid arbitration. \06 A party typically
argues that the ensuing complexity has rendered the virtues of arbitration
- efficiency and cost effectiveness - unavailing, and therefore the arbitration agreement should be set aside. \07 The Court, however, found this
argument unconvincing and held that the federal Act requires "piecemeal litigation" when necessary to give effect to an arbitration
agreement. \08
Second, the Court found that the order in which the two forums,
state and federal, obtained and exercised their jurisdiction supported the
court of appeals's refusal to defer to state court jurisdiction. \09 After
expressing its view that priority is not to be measured in terms of which
complaint was filed first, but rather in terms of how much progress has
been made in the respective forums, the Court found that greater progress had been made in the federal forum and thus federal jurisdiction
was warranted. I \0 The Court buttressed its argument with the Congressional intent embodied in the federal Act to "move parties to an arbitrable dispute out of court and into' arbitration as quickly and easily as

103.
104.

105.
106.
107.

108.

109.
110.

case. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 16. The balance is initially heavily weighted in
favor of the exercise of federal jurisdiction. !d.
Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 19.
Id. at 19-21.
Id.
Ness, supra note 92, at 5-6.
See, e.g., County of Jefferson v. Barton-Douglas Contractors, Inc., 282 N. W.2d 155,
159 (Iowa 1979) (arbitration stayed); Prestressed Concrete, Inc. v. Adolfson & Peterson, Inc., 308 Minn. 20, 24, 240 N.W.2d 551, 553 (1976) (same); J.F. Inc. v.
Vicik, 99 III. App. 3d 815, 820-21,426 N.E.2d 257, 262 (1981) (same).
Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 19-21. The Court relied on several decisions of the
federal courts of appeals: C. Itoh & Co. v. Jordan InCI Co., 552 F.2d 1228 (7th Cir.
1977); Acevedo Maldonado v. P.P.G. Indus., Inc., 514 F.2d 614 (1st Cir. 1975);
Hamilton Life Ins. Co. v. Republic Nat') Life Ins. Co., 408 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1969).
Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 20 n.23. This represents the first occasion where the
Court was unable to base its holding on a procedural arbitration issue by strictly
interpreting the language of the federal Act. Cf Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood &
Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967) (section 4 provides the "explicit" rule on the
separability issue); Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198 (1956) (section 2 requires a transaction in commerce before the federal Act is applied).
Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 21.
Id. at 21-23.
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possible." III The Court saw the district court's stay of arbitration pending the outcome of the state court litigation as frustrating this intent and,
in effect, chastised the lower court for its action. I 12
Third, the Court found another factor - which forum's law, federal
or state, provides the rule of decision in a given case - to be instructive
in determining which tribunal is proper. 113 The applicability of federal
law usually supports the federal court's exercise of jurisdiction, whereas
state law applicability usually favors surrender of federal court jurisdiction. 114 In Moses H Cone, however, when considering the impact of the
choice of law on the choice of forum, the Court found that "[f]ederallaw
in terms of the Arbitration Act governs that issue in either state or federal court."IIS The Court's finding that the federal Act applied in both
forums actually weighed against the federal court's exercise of its jurisdiction 116 and thus was dicta.ll7 This was, however, a telltale indication
of the Court's recognition of the applicability of the federal Act as substantive federal law in state courts and confirmed the reconciliation made
by Judge Medina twenty-four years earlier in Robert Lawrence. I IS
Once the Court was satisfied that the federal Act provided the rule
of decision in Moses H Cone, it considered the dispute that had initiated
the litigation - whether the issue of timeliness of demand for arbitration
is to be decided by the arbitrator or the court. Unlike the issue of separability in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co., 119 the
Court in Moses H Cone found the federal Act silent on the timeliness
question. 120 As a result of this silence, the Court was forced to resort to
the "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements" 121 as support
for its holding that the timeliness issue is arbitrable. 122 The Court found
that the "Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter offederallaw, any
doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved m
111. /d. at 22.
112. Id. It appears that as long as a section 4 petition is filed with a federal court as soon
as state-court proceedings are initiated, no federal district court would be justified in
refusing to exercise its jurisdiction over the matter, provided the usual prerequisite
jurisdictional elements are present. See Ness, supra note 92, at 6.
113. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 23-26.
114. See Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 667 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (case involves issues of federal law); id. at 676-77 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(same); Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 825-26 (same).
115. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24.
116. Because the federal Act is applicable in both forums, its status as federal law has less
impact on the choice of forum. The Court, however, pointed out that its "task in
cases such as this is not to find some substantial reason for the exercise of federal
jurisdiction . . . ; rather, the task is to ascertain whether there exist 'exceptional'
circumstances . . . to justify the surrender of that jurisdiction." Id. at 25-26 (emphasis in original).
117. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1,24 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
118. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
120. See Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24-25.
121. Id.
122.Id.
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favor of arbitration."123
The probable inadequacy of state court proceedings to protect Mercury's rights was cited as another factor supporting surrender of the state
court's jurisdiction. 124 After indicating that state courts are obliged to
grant stays of litigation pending arbitration under section 3 of the federal
Act,125 the Court expressed its concern as to whether the same is true of
an order to arbitrate under section 4. 126 The uncertainty of the applicability of section 4 in state court was used to demonstrate the potential
inadequacy of available remedies in that forum. 127 This uncertainty was
based upon the language of section 4 which provides that a party aggrieved by another's refusal to arbitrate "may petition any United States
District Court"128 in order to compel arbitration. 129 The Court expressed its concern that a party able to effect a stay of court proceedings
pending arbitration in state court via section 3 may be unable to compel
arbitration in the same state court via section 4, and therefore may be
forced to resort to a separate federal court action. This, it was argued,
would be "a pointless and wasteful burden on the supposedly summary
and speedy procedures prescribed by the Arbitration ACt."130 The
Court's language in Moses H. Cone is clear in its intent to direct state
courts to provide the section 4 remedy, regardless of its jurisdictional
inapplicability there. In a state court case with diverse parties, one
party's resistance to arbitration following a section 3 stay would result in
the filing of a separate federal action to compel arbitration under section
4. This would not only be costly and inefficient, but could also be seen as
an expression of a lack of good faith on behalf of the resisting party.
B.

Southland Corp. v. Keating

Speculation as to the propriety of commanding the state courts to
invoke section 4 was further emphasized in a more recent decision of the
Supreme Court, Southland Corp. v. Keating. 131 In Southland, doubt was
cast not only upon the use of section 4 in state courts, but also upon the
use of section 3, which the Court in Moses H. Cone had stated would be
applicable in state courts. 132 Southland considered the constitutionality
123. Id. The Court listed several issues that it viewed as arbitrable: "construction of the
contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability." Id.
124. !d. at 26-27.
125. Id. at 26-27, 26 n.35.
126. Id. at 26-27.
127. !d. The court noted that in a factual situation such as the one presented in Moses H.
Cone, where the party seeking to avoid arbitration is the one from whom performance or payment is due, a section 3 stay is inadequate: "It leaves the recalcitrant
party free to sit and do nothing - neither to litigate nor to arbitrate." Id.
128. 9 U.S.c. § 4.
129. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 26 & n.35.
130. !d. at 27.
131. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
132. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
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ofa section of the California Franchise Investment Law (CFIL)\33 which
was interpreted to require judicial consideration of claims brought under
the statute and, therefore, resulted in the state court's refusal to enforce
the parties' agreement to arbitrate such claims.134 Keating filed a class
action against Southland Corporation on behalf of approximately 800
California 7-11 franchises alleging, in addition to contract violations, a
violation of the disclosure requirements of the CFIL. \35 Southland Corporation's motion to compel arbitration was granted on all claims except
those based on the statute.136 On appeal, California's highest court held
that the CFIL did not contravene the federal Act and that the claims
asserted under the statute were not arbitrable. \37 The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that Congress, in enacting the federal Act, created "a
substantive rule applicable in state as well as federal courts [and] intended to foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements."138
The Court relied largely upon legislative history l39 to support its
interpretation of the federal Act as a Congressional proclamation that
contemplated not only a broad purpose,l40 but also a broad reach.141 In
dissent, Justice O'Connor argued that the Act's legislative history
demonstrated an intent "to require federal, not state, courts to respect
arbitration agreements."142 The majority responded by stating that the
Act's express limitation to contracts involving commerce could be explained only by Congress's intent to utilize its commerce clause powers
to enforce arbitration agreements in state courts. 143
Justice O'Connor argued further that the majority's application of
section 2 in Southland as a means for enforcement of the arbitration
agreement exceeded that section's scope. l44 Section 2 is limited to mak133. CAL. CORP. CODE § 31512 (West 1977). The statute provides in pertinent part:
"Any condition, stipulation or provision purporting to bind any person acquiring
any franchise to waive compliance with any provision of this law or any rule or
order hereunder is void." [d.
134. Keating v. Superior Court, 31 Cal.3d 584, 645 P.2d 1192, 183 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1982),
rev'd sub nom. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
135. Keating alleged, in part, fraud, oral misrepresentation, breach of contract, breach of
fiduciary duty, and violation of the disclosure requirements of the CFIL. Southland
Corp., 465 U.S. at 4.
136. [d.
137. Keating v. Superior Court, 31 Cal.3d 584, 645 P.2d 1192, 183 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1982),
rev'd sub nom. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
138. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 16.
139. The Court relied on the House Report on the United States Arbitration Act, H.R.
REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924), and held that the federal Act is based
upon "the incontestable federal foundations of 'control over interstate commerce
and over admiralty.''' Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 11 (quoting Prima Paint Corp.
v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395,405 (1967».
140. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 12-13.
141. [d. at 13-14.
142. [d. at 23 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
143. /d. at 14-15.
144. See id. at 31 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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ing arbitration agreements "valid, irrevocable and enforceable," 145 but
does not, in and of itself, provide for specific enforcement. 146 The right
of specific enforcement of an arbitration agreement is available under section 4. Justice O'Connor reasoned that if section 2 standing alone creates
this right, the enforcement provisions, sections 3 and 4, are rendered
largely superfluous. 147 In an attempt to rebut this contention, the majority stated that its holding in Southland, preempting a state statute that
withdraws power to enforce arbitration agreements, does not mean that
sections 3 and 4 of the federal Act apply in proceedings in state courts, 148
hence calling into question the language in Moses H. Cone to the effect
that section 3 is applicable in state courts.149
Although it may be true that sections 3 and 4 are not per se applicable in state courts, the Court has clearly mandated the enforceability of
arbitration agreements, and in doing so has created a need for procedures
necessary to implement this mandate. It is irrelevant whether the procedures used in state courts are those provided by the federal Act, or those
provided by a synonomous state statute. 150 The ultimate outcome - the
undisputable enforcement of arbitration agreements - will be the same.
C.

Silence on Procedural Issues Warrants Legislative Revision

The vigor with which the Court has approached the enforceability
of arbitration agreements is founded within the language of section 2.
Those provisions left to carry out the Act's goals - sections 3 and 4 are, however, jurisdictionally deficient in state courts. 151 Regardless, the
court's intent to encourage state court submission to these provisions is
clear.
If the Court should seek in a later decision to mandate the application of section 3 in state courts, it could seize upon that section's ambiguous language providing for a stay of court proceedings "in any of the
courts of the United States."152 It may be argued that state courts are
courts "of" the United States. 153 The Supreme Court could support its
holding with the statement in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America
9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) (emphasis added).
Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 31-32.
Id. at 31 n.20 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 16 n.lO.
See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
A majority of states have enacted their own arbitration acts. Almost all have
adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act or some variance thereof. See 7 U.L.A. I
(Supp. 1985). Although the Uniform Arbitration Act is in many respects similar to
the federal Act, judicial interpretation in the various states differ. Id.
151. See Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 16 n.lO.
152. 9 U.S.c. § 3 (1982).
153. See Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 26 n.34. But see Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 29
n.18 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor states that" 'courts of the United
States' is a term of art whose meaning is unmistakable. State courts are 'in' but not
'of the United States." Id.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
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that "Sections 1, 2, and 3 are integral parts of a whole." 154 Thus, it may
be argued that the jurisdictional provisions of section 2 apply equally to
section 3. Further support may be garnered from state court precedent.
Many state courts have recognized that applicability of section 3 is necessary to carry out Congress's intent to mandate the enforcement of arbitration agreements and have liberally applied that section. 155
Section 4, unlike section 3, is not ambiguous in its terms l56 and is
not within the realm of the Court's statement in Bernhardt. Still, because
section 4 provides the remedy of specific performance of an agreement to
arbitrate, the section is necessary to insure the implementation of section
2.157 Although the scenario described in Moses H Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., encouraging a party in a state court
proceeding to resort to a separate action in federal court to obtain a section 4 order to arbitrate, 158 is available in a diversity situation, a question
remains as to that party's options if there is no diversity. Once a party
has obtained a section 3 stay order on the basis of a contract evidencing a
transaction in commerce, the party conceivably will be unable to force
arbitration because of the unavailability of a section 4 type remedy in
state court and may also be denied access to a federal forum because
there is no diversity. Furthermore, prior federal court decisions indicate
conclusively that the federal Act does not create independent federal
question jurisdiction. 159
The need to rewrite the Act is supported by its failure to provide
adequate procedural guidelines for the enforcement of arbitration agreements. This failure is best exemplified by the manner in which the Court
has addressed the procedural issues that have confronted it. In the 1967
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co. decision, the
Court addressed the procedural issue of separability and appeared reluctant to rely on policy and legislative history to support its holding that
section 4 requires an allegation of fraud to be directed expressly to an
agreement to arbitrate in order to void that agreement. 160 However, in
the Court's most recent decisions, Moses H Cone and Southland Corp. v.
Keating, such was not the case. In Moses H Cone, the Court relied on
154. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
155. See, e.g., DiMambro-Northend Assoc. v. Blanck-Alvarez, 251 Ga. 704, 309 S.E.2d
364 (1983) (relying on Moses H. Cone); Allison v. Medicab Int'l, Inc., 92 Wash.2d
199, 597 P.2d 380 (1979) (entire Act applies in state court); United Nuclear Corp. v.
General Atomic Co., 93 N.M. 105,597 P.2d 290, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 911 (1979)
(same).
156. Section 4 is specific in that it permits a party aggrieved by another's refusal to arbitrate to "petition any United States district court." 9 U.S.c. § 4 (1982).
157. See supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 124-30 and accompanying text.
159. See, e.g., Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. I, 25 n.32 (federal Act does not create federal
question jurisdiction); Commercial Metals Co. v. Balfour, Guthrie, and Co., 577
F.2d 264, 269 (5th Cir. 1978) (same); Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics,
Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 408 (2d Cir. 1959) (same).
160. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
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the liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements in determining
that the issue of timeliness of demand is one to be decided by the arbitrator.161 In Southland, the Court relied largely upon legislative history to
support its finding that section 2 applies in state courts. 162 Thus, it is
apparent that the Court has stretched statutory interpretation to its limit
in order to resolve procedural issues under the Act.
Another procedural issue, that of the permissibility of superimposing class actions on arbitration proceedings, remains unclear under the
Act. In Southland, the parties failed to dispute this issue at the state
court level, and the Supreme Court therefore refused to pass judgment. 163 The California Supreme Court, however, concluded that such
actions were permissible, but was similarly unable to base its decision on
the face of the federal Act. l64 This presents an example of a state court
confronted by the Act's facial silence on a specific procedure issue. 165
The Court's sweeping policy of enforcing arbitration agreements has
developed as a result of the lack of statutory guidelines in the form of a
modern and workable arbitration statute. Implementation of this policy
in federal courts arguably is tolerable. Consideration of the problems
inherent in the interpretation of the ambiguous federal statute in fifty
separate state jurisdictions, however, further underscores the need for
legislative revision.
Legislative revision should address the procedural problems arising
under the Act. Such revisions should prescribe methods for undertaking
class actions in arbitration, rules governing consolidation of arbitrable
disputes, and guidelines for establishing when a party has waived its right
to enforce an arbitration agreement. Although judicial decisions already
have determined that the arbitrator, not the court, decides the issue of
timeliness of demand,166 and that the separability doctrine governs the
issue of fraud in the inducement of a container contract, 167 Congressional
review of these decisions is appropriate. Finally, provisions must be added indicating Congress's intent to exercise its commerce power not only
through section 2, but also through every section of the Act. Only in this
161.
162.
163.
164.

See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 8-9.
See Keating v. Superior Court, 31 Ca1.3d 584, 645 P.2d 1192, 183 Cal. Rptr. 360
(1982), rev'd sub nom. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). Without
stating that the federal Act controlled, the court analogized cases permitting consolidation of arbitration proceedings under the Act to the permissibility of class actions
in arbitration. [d. at 610-11, 645 P.2d at 1208, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 376.
165. A death of cases address the issue of class actions in arbitration. For discussion, see
Keating v. Superior Ct., 31 Ca1.3d 584, 645 P.2d 1192, 183 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1982),
rev'd sub nom. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Keating v. Superior
Ct., 109 Cal. App. 3d 858, 167 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1980), rev'd, 31 Ca1.3d 584, 645 P.2d
1192, 183 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1982), rev'd sub nom. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465
U.S. 1 (1984); Note, Classwide Arbitration: Efficient Adjudication or Procedural
Quagmire?, 67 VA. L. REV. 787 (1981).
166. See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
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manner will it be clear that the entire Act applies in state courts. Further, the scenario described in Moses H. Cone, where a party obtains a
stay via section 3 in state court but is unable to compel arbitration via
section 4,168 will be avoided.
IV.

THE THRESHOLD QUESTION - WHAT IS A CONTRACT
"EVIDENCING A TRANSACTION INVOLVING
COMMERCE?"

A.

Statutory Interpretation
It is undisputed that, except in admiralty transactions, for an arbitration agreement to come within the ambit of the federal Act it must be
contained in a "contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce."169 Although "commerce" is defined in section 1 of the Act as
"commerce among the several states,"170 the terms "evidencing" and
"involving" remain undefined.
These terms have been targeted by those seeking to narrow the
scope of the Act. A strict interpretation of the term "contract evidencing
a transaction involving commerce" would seem to require the contract,
on its face, to reveal that an interstate transaction is to take place. 171
Similarly, the use of the term "involving" commerce, in lieu of the more
traditional term "affecting" commerce, has been the basis of an argument
that Congress, when conceiving the federal Act, did not intend to exercise the full extent of its commerce clause powers. l72 A restricted exercise of this power is also supported by consideration of Congress's
relatively deflated powers under the commerce clause in 1925 when the
federal Act was enacted. 173

B.

The Lumbard Test
Notwithstanding these contrary arguments, courts have broadly
construed the commerce requirement when applying the federal Act.
Although numerous decisions have addressed the issue,174 few have attempted to develop a test to determine when a contract is one "evidencing a transaction involving commerce." In Metro Industrial Painting Co.
v. Terminal Construction Co., 175 Chief Judge Lumbard made what is perhaps the only bona fide attempt. 176 The Chief Judge stated that the sig168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

See supra notes 124-30, 158 and accompanying text.
9 U.S.c. § 2 (1982).
9 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
See Metro Indus. Painting Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Co., 287 F.2d 382, 387 (2d
Cir. 1961) (Lumbard, c.J., concurring) (recognizing and rejecting argument that
Act requires a contract, on its face, to reveal an interstate transaction).
See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395,409-10 & n.3
(1966) (Black, J., dissenting).
See Ness, supra note 92, at 8 n.32.
See infra notes 179, 184.
287 F.2d 382 (2d Cir. 1961).
See Ness, supra note 92, at 7-8 n.30.
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nificant question "is not whether, in carrying out the terms of the
contract, the parties did cross state lines, but whether, at the time they
entered into it and accepted the arbitration clause, they contemplated
substantial interstate activity."177 This interpretation, Chief Judge Lumbard reasoned, is supported by a Congressional intent not to bind to arbitration parties who did not choose to be bound, but rather "to assure
those who desired arbitration and whose contracts related to interstate
commerce that their expectations would not be undermined by federal
judges or . . . by state courts or legislatures."178
A significant number of decisions, though not a majority, have relied
on this reasoning. 179 In R.J. Palmer Construction Co. v. Wichita Band
Instrument Co., 180 the court admitted that the evidence presented came
perilously close to failing to meet the interstate commerce requirement. 181 Relying on Chief Judge Lumbard's reasoning,182 however, the
court held that the construction contract was one involving interstate
commerce because it "contemplated" the interstate shipment of construction materials and was entered into by parties aware that the completed structure was to be used to house goods moved in interstate
commerce. 183
Numerous arbitration agreements arising out of construction contracts have been found to involve interstate commerce as required by the
federal Act. Courts have considered a variety of factors, including the
parties' principal places of business, the interstate transport of construction materials and equipment, the interstate travel of construction and
design personnel, the location of contract sureties, and the purpose for
which a structure was constructed. 184 In view of the broad scope of these
177. Metro Industrial Painting Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Co., 287 F.2d 382, 387 (2d Cir.
1961) (Lumbard, c.J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
178. Id. Although it did not recognize the test proferred by Chief Judge Lumbard, the
Supreme Court has cited this language with approval. See Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 13 (1984).
179. See Gavlick Constr. Co. v. H.F. Campbell Co., 389 F. Supp. 551 (W.D. Pa. 1975)
(dicta); Garfield & Co. v. Wiest, 308 F. Supp. 1107 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Monte v.
Southern Del. County Auth., 212 F. Supp. 604 (E.D. Pa. 1963); Burke County Public Schools v. Shaver Partnership, 303 N.C. 408,279 S.E.2d 816 (1981); Riverfront
Properties Ltd. v. Max Factor III, 460 So.2d 948 (Fla. App. 1984); Cahoon v.
Ziman, 60 N.C. App. 226, 298 S.E.2d 729 (1983); R.J. Palmer Constr. Co. v. Wichita Band Instrument Co., 7 Kan. App. 2d 363, 642 P.2d 127 (1982).
180. 7 Kan. App. 2d 363, 642 P.2d 127 (1982).
181. Id. at 365, 642 P.2d at 129.
182. Id. at 367, 642 P.2d at 130.
183. Id.
184. See, e.g., American Home Assurance Co. v. Vecco Concrete Constr. Co., 659 F.2d
961 (4th Cir. 1980) (materials, equipment, personnel, bonding company); Mastmead
MAC Drilling Corp. v. Fleck, 549 F. Supp. 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (parties); Fairchild
& Co. v. Richmond F. & P.R.R., 516 F. Supp. 1305 (D.C.D.C. 1981) (lease, financial obligations, labor, materials); John Ashe Assoc. & Envirogenics Co., 425 F.
Supp. 238 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (parties, materials, personnel); c.P. Robinson Constr.
Co. v. National Corp. for Hous. Partnership, 375 F. Supp. 446 (M.D.N.C. 1974)
(personnel, suppliers, bonding company); Warren Bros. Co. v. Community Bldg.
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factors, it is difficult to imagine any contract arising from a major construction project that would not involve sufficient interstate commerce to
fulfill the terms of the federal Act. Thus, because the Supreme Court has
held that the Act applies in state courts,185 existing state arbitration statutes are virtually preempted in construction contract disputes. 186
V.

APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL ACT IN STATE
COURTS - THE EFFECT ON MARYLAND LAW

A.

Timeliness of Demand -

Is Bel Pre Good Law?

Several state courts, relying on Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co. and Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics,
Inc., recognized the broad reach of the federal Act long before the
Supreme Court's decision in Southland Corp. v. Keating. 187 For example,
the Texas Court of Appeals faced this issue over twelve years ago in
Mamlin v. Susan Thomas, Inc. 188 There, a common law rule invalidated
arbitration agreements. 189 This common law rule was disregarded, however, because the contract involved interstate commerce, and thus the
federal Act applied. 190
Although some courts have refused, 191 most have applied the Act in
state court proceedings if appropriate and properly pleaded. 192 Although

185.
186.

187.

188.
189.

190.
191.
192.

Corp., 386 F. Supp. 656 (M.D.N.C. 1974) (personnel, materials, bonding company);
Kodak Mining Co. v. Carrs Fork Corp., 669 S.W.2d 917 (Ky. 1984) (coal mining
leases); R.I. Palmer Constr. Co. v. Wichita Band Instrument Co., 7 Kan. App. 2d
363, 642 P.2d 127 (1982) (materials, use of structure); Northwest Mechanical, Inc.
v. Public Uti I. Comm., 283 N.W.2d 522 (Minn. 1979) (materials).
See supra notes 9, 114-18, 138 and accompanying text.
Maryland has its own arbitration act: Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act, MD.
CrS. & IUD. PROe. CODE ANN. §§ 3-201 to 3-234 (1982). The Maryland Uniform
Arbitration Act was enacted in recognition of arbitration's primary purpose to "discourage litigation and to foster voluntary resolution of disputes in a forum created,
controlled and administered according to the parties' agreement to arbitrate." Bel
Pre Medical Center, Inc. v. Frederick Contractors, Inc., 21 Md. App. 307, 320, 320
A.2d 558, 565 (1974) (citing Maietta v. Greenfield, 267 Md. 287,291,297 A.2d 244,
246 (1972», rev'd on other grounds, 274 Md. 307, 334 A.2d 526 (1975).
See, e.g., Mamlin v. Susan Thomas, Inc., 490 S.W.2d 634 (Tex. 1973) (relying on
both Prima Paint and Robert Lawrence); Path man Constr. Co. v. Knox County
Hosp. Ass'n, 164 Ind. App. 121,326 N.E.2d 844 (1975) (same); Pinkis v. Network
Cinema Corp., 9 Wash. App. 337, 512 P.2d 751 (1973) (same).
490 S.W.2d 634 (Tex. 1973).
Id. at 636 n.2. The Texas common law rule required parties entering contracts
subject to arbitration to do so only "upon the advice of counsel to both parties as
evidenced by counsel's signature thereto." Id.
Id. at 636-37.
See Kress Corp. v. Edward C. Levy Co., 102 III. App. 3d 264, 430 N.E.2d 593
(1981); Pullman, Inc. v. Phoenix Steel Corp., 304 A.2d 334 (Del. 1973).
See Kodak Mining Co. v. Carrs Fork Corp., 669 S.W.2d 917 (Ky. 1984); Northwest
Mechanical, Inc. v. Public Util. Comm., 283 N.W.2d 522 (Minn. 1979); Mamlin v.
Susan Thomas, Inc., 490 S. W.2d 634 (Tex. 1973); Palmer Constr. Co. v. Wichita
Band Instrument Co., 7 Kan. App. 2d 363, 642 P.2d 127 (1982); Pathman Constr.
Co. v. Knox County Hosp. Ass'n, 164 Ind. App. 121,326 N.E.2d 844 (1975); Pinkis
v. Network Cinema Corp., 9 Wash. App. 337, 512 P.2d 751 (1973).
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Maryland courts have yet to apply the Act,193 it is arguable that had the
federal Act as construed in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury
Construction Corp. been applied in the 1975 case of Frederick Contractors, Inc. v. Bel Pre Medical Center, Inc. 194 the court of appeals would
have reached an opposite conclusion.
In Bel Pre, a dispute arose between the parties with regard to payment on a contract for the construction of a nursing home. Bel Pre Medical Center, Inc. moved to compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration
clause in the contract. 195 Frederick Contractors Inc. did not deny that
the substantive dispute was arbitrable under the contract terms, but contended that Bel Pre Medical Center, Inc. had waived its right to arbitrate
by failing to file a timely demand for arbitration, and that the issue of
compliance with such a procedural prerequisite was to be decided by the
court, not the arbitrator. 196 Although the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland held that the issue of timeliness was to be decided by the arbitrator,197 the court of appeals reversed, and without considering the federal Act, held that the procedural issue should be decided by a court. 198
The court of appeals's position on this issue is contrary to the
Supreme Court's 1983 decision in Moses H. Cone. 199 Where the subject
contract evidences a transaction in commerce, Bel Pre is superseded by
the holding in Moses H. Cone that the timeliness issue is for the arbitrator to decide. 2°O Although Bel Pre is no longer binding precedent in
cases with contracts involving interstate commerce, the Bel Pre rule still
may apply in those few situations where there is no interstate commerce.
Following Bel Pre in those cases, however, would only promote confusion and uncertainty. For example, if a party is faced with a dispute
under circumstances similar to those in Bel Pre, the arbitrability of the
procedural issue will turn on the presence of interstate commerce. Sec193. The Court of Appeals of Maryland considered application of the federal Act in
Litton Bionetics v. Glen Constr. Co., 292 Md. 34, 437 A.2d 208 (1981). See infra
notes 223-32 and accompanying text.
194. 274 Md. 307, 334 A.2d 526 (1975).
195. [d. at 308-09, 334 A.2d at 527-28. The arbitration clause was Article 7.10 of A.I.A.
(American Institute of Architects) form A201, General Conditions of the Contract
for Construction (1967 ed.). [d. at 308, 310-11, 334 A.2d at 528-29.
196. Bel Pre Medical Center, Inc. v. Frederick Contractors, Inc., 21 Md. App. 307, 314,
320 A.2d 558, 562 (1974), rev'd, 274 Md. 307, 334 A.2d 526 (1975).
197. /d. at 330, 320 A.2d at 572. The opinion was authored by the late Honorable Rita
C. Davidson while she was an Associate Judge of the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland. [d. at 309, 320 A.2d at 560. The late Judge Davidson, who later became
an Associate Judge of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, was considered especially
well versed in arbitration law. Although reversed, this opinion was termed in several succeeding court of appeals decisions as a "scholarly opinion." See Memorial
Services for the Honorable Rita C. Davidson, Associate Judge Court of Appeals of
Maryland, April 19, 1985, reprinted in 302 Md. LVIII, LX (1985) (Memorial Minute presented by Honorable Richard P. Gilbert).
198. Frederick Contractors, Inc. v. Bel Pre Medical Center, Inc., 274 Md. 307, 314, 334
A.2d 526, 530 (1975).
199. See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
200. /d.
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tion 2 of the federal Act would apply in state court if the contract
"evidenc[ed] a transaction involving commerce,"201 and consequently the
timeliness issue would be decided by the arbitrator regardless of a lack of
diversity. If interstate commerce was not present, however, Bel Pre
would require the court to decide the timeliness issue. The potential for
inconsistent results is rampant.
Such inconsistent results are suspect, especially when one considers
that the Maryland policy with regard to the enforcement of arbitration
agreements parallels that prescribed by the federal Act. The Maryland
Uniform Arbitration Act,202 enacted in 1965,203 embodies a legislative
policy favoring executory agreements to arbitrate. 204 Furthermore, arbitration is viewed as a "favored action" in Maryland. 205 In Moses H.
Cone, the Supreme Court found this same policy embodied in the federal
Act to support a holding that the arbitrator, not the court, decides the
timeliness issue. 206 Hence, it appears that consistent policies will nevertheless give rise to inconsistent results on this issue. To avoid this inconsistency, and to further a policy of promoting arbitration, the Maryland
court should reconsider the rule set forth in Bel Pre.
Maryland's highest court had just that opportunity in the 1983 case
of Gold Coast Mall, Inc. v. Lamar Corp. ,207 decided less than ten months
after the Supreme Court's Moses H. Cone decision. In Gold Coast, the
court of appeals was again faced with an issue of whether a party had
waived its right to arbitrate by its failure to comply with procedural prerequisites set forth by contract.2° 8 As in Bel Pre, the procedural issue in
Gold Coast was decided by the court and not the arbitrator. 209 The court
applied Maryland's Uniform Arbitration Act;210 the potential conflict
with the federal Act, however, never arose because neither party attempted to demonstrate that the contract was one involving com201.
202.
203.
204.

205.

206.
207.
208.

209.

210.

9 u.s.c. § 2 (1982).
MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-201 to 3-234 (1984).
Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act, 1965 Md. Laws, ch. 231, § 2.
Gold Coast Mall, Inc. v. Lamar Corp., 298 Md. 96, 103,468 A.2d 91, 95 (1983);
Charles J. Frank, Inc. v. Associated Jewish Charities, Inc., 294 Md. 443, 448, 450
A.2d 1304, 1306 (1982); C. W. Jackson & Assoc. v. Brooks, 289 Md. 658, 666, 426
A.2d 378, 382 (1981).
Bel Pre Medical Center, Inc. v. Frederick Contractors, Inc., 21 Md. App. 307, 320,
320 A.2d 558, 565 (1974), rev'd on other grounds, 274 Md. 307, 334 A.2d 526
(1975).
See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
298 Md. 96, 468 A.2d 91 (1983).
/d. at 99, 468 A.2d at 93. The arbitration agreement required that, in the event of a
disagreement, an arbitrator be appointed by each party within fifteen days after a
sixty-day negotiation period. Gold Coast Mall failed to abide by this provision. Id.
at 101-02, 468 A.2d at 94.
Id. at 108, 468 A.2d at 97-98. In determining whether to decide the procedural
issue, the court relied on Frederick Contractors, Inc. v. Bel Pre Medical Center,
Inc., 274 Md. 307, 334 A.2d 526 (1975). Gold Coast Mall, Inc. v. Lamar Corp., 298
Md. 96, 108 n.3, 468 A.2d 91, 98 n.3 (1983).
MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-201 to 3-234 (1984).
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merce. 211 Notwithstanding the absence of interstate commerce, the Gold
Coast court could have seized the opportunity to criticize the Bel Pre rule
and to dispel the inconsistency between that rule and the rule announced
in Moses H. Cone.
The court in Gold Coast refused to decide a second issue-whether
the substantive dispute fell within the scope of the arbitration agreement. 212 The court held that questions of substantive arbitrability should
in most cases be left for the arbitrator. 213 Hence, under Maryland's Uniform Arbitration Act,214 an initial determination is made as to whether a
disputed issue is substantive or procedural. An issue regarding the former is left to the arbitrator, and an issue regarding the latter is submitted
to the court. Gold Coast demonstrates the Maryland court's alignment
on the issue of substantive arbitrability with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the federal Act. 215
Although the court thwarted the arbitrator's jurisdiction on the procedural issue in Gold Coast, the ultimate outcome was consistent with a
policy of promoting arbitration. The court held that Gold Coast Mall's
failure to comply with the procedural prerequisites did not amount to a
waiver, and therefore arbitration should be compelled. 216 The court's denial of Lamar's attempt to avoid arbitration is indicative of how similar
procedural disputes will be viewed in the future. It is unlikely that mere
211. There was no discussion of the interstate commerce issue. The agreement in dispute
was a lease. Gold Coast Mall, 298 Md. at 101-02,468 A.2d at 94-95. Whether the
lease agreement was a transaction involving commerce is questionable. Compare
Fairchild & Co. v. Richmond F. & P. R.R., 516 F. Supp. 1305 (D.C.D.C. 1981)
(lease agreement contemplating extensive commercial venture serving Washington,
D.C., Maryland, and Virginia is a contract involving commerce) with Paramore v.
Inter-Regional Financial Group Leasing Co., 68 N.C. App. 659, 316 S.E.2d 90
(1984) (where activity under lease occurred in one state, and only event occurring
elsewhere was lessor's receipt of rental payments, contract did not involve
commerce).
212. Gold Coast Mall, 298 Md. at 108,468 A.2d at 97.
213. Id. at 107-08,468 A.2d at 97. The issue of substantive arbitrability arises when the
parties are in conflict as to the scope of an arbitration agreement. Once such an
issue arises, the natural question is who decides - the court or the arbitrator. According to Gold Coast, the legislative policy in favor of the enforcement of arbitration agreement dictates that this issue should be left to the arbitrator. /d. at 107,
468 A.2d at 97.
214. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-201 to 3-234 (1984).
215. In Moses H. Cone, the court appeared to disregard the distinction between substantive and procedural issues when considering arbitrability. See supra notes 120-23
and accompanying text.
216. Gold Coast Mall, 298 Md. at 114,468 A.2d at 100. The Court of Appeals of Maryland previously addressed the waiver issue in Charles J. Frank, Inc. v. Associated
Jewish Charities, 294 Md. 443, 450 A.2d 1304 (1982), where it was held that litigation of one issue subject to arbitration does not constitute a waiver of other unrelated arbitrable issues arising from the same contract. Id. at 455, 450 A,2d at 1310.
See Note, Contract Law - Waiver of Arbitration Rights by Litigating One Issue is
Not a Waiver of the Same Rights as to Unrelated Issues, Charles J. Frank, Inc. v.
Associated Jewish Charities, Inc., 294 Md. 443, 450 A.2d 1304 (1982), 12 U. BALT.
L. REV. 585 (1983).
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disregard of procedural prerequisites will be sufficient to demonstrate a
party's intent to waive the right to enforce arbitration.

B.

The Prospect of Duplicative Proceedings as a Basis for Avoiding
Arbitration

In Moses H. Cone, the Supreme Court stated that "an arbitration
agreement must be enforced notwithstanding the presence of other persons who are parties to the underlying dispute but not to the arbitration
agreement."217 Thus, under the federal Act, an attempt by one party to
an arbitration agreement to join a party not similarly bound will not warrant undermining the agreement, regardless of the potential inconsistency of results. 2lS
The Maryland position on this issue was expressed in Charles J.
Frank, Inc. v. Associated Jewish Charities, Inc.,219 and is in accord with
Moses H. Cone. In Frank, a construction project owner entered into two
separate contracts: the first was with the general contractor and contained provisions for arbitration; the second was with the project architect and lacked such provisions. 22o When a dispute arose involving all
three parties, the owner sought a stay of arbitration and argued that he
otherwise would be subject to duplicative arbitration and judicial proceedings. 221 The court of appeals rejected the owner's argument, again
relying on the legislative policy favoring enforcement of executory agreements to arbitrate, and held that this policy warranted enforcement of
the arbitration agreement, regardless of the prospect of duplicative proceedings and the potential for inconsistent results. 222

C.

Consolidation of Arbitration Proceedings

The issue of the consolidation of arbitration proceedings was addressed by the court of appeals in another construction industry case,
Litton Bionetics, Inc. v. Glen Construction CO.223 In Litton, the owner
entered into arbitration agreements with both the general contractor and
the project architect. 224 After arbitrable disputes based on common subject matter arose between the owner and the architect and between the
owner and the contractor, the owner filed a demand for arbitration and
sought consolidation of both arbitration proceedings. 225 Neither agree217. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,20 (1983).
See supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text.
219. 294 Md. 443, 450 A.2d 1304 (1982).
220. Id. at 455, 450 A.2d at 1310.
221. !d. This is a tactic commonly used to avoid agreements to arbitrate. See supra
notes 104-08 and accompanying text.
222. Charles J. Frank, Inc. v. Associated Jewish Charities, Inc., 294 Md. 443, 459-60,
460 A.2d 1304, 1311-12.
223. 292 Md. 34,437 A.2d 208 (1981).
224. Id. at 36-37, 437 A.2d at 209.
225. Id. at 38, 437 A.2d at 210.
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ment expressly required or prohibited consolidation. 226 The court found,
however, that provisions of the Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act,227
providing that an arbitration agreement "confers jurisdiction on a court
to enforce the agreement,"228 permitted the exercise of judicial power to
order consolidation. 229
In Litton, the owner not only sought to support its consolidation
argument with the provisions of the Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act,
but also contended in the alternative that the federal Act applied and
similarly mandated consolidation. 230 The court of appeals surveyed
cases decided under the federal Act and noted that these cases interpreted the federal Act to allow consolidation. 231 Thereafter, the court
implied a willingness to apply the federal Act in proper circumstances,
but found that no difference would result in the instant case and, therefore, refused to rule on the issue of the federal Act's applicability.232
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's recent decisions in Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp. and Southland Corp. v. Keating
have displayed an unequivocal judicial policy mandating the enforcement
of arbitration agreements in both federal and state courts. Southland declares that state statutes impeding arbitratrion will not be tolerated under
the auspices of the federal Act. Moses H. Cone, on the other hand, raises
a presumption that questions of procedural arbitrability will never warrant access to the courts.
Under Maryland law, however, questions of procedural arbitrability
Id. at 43, 437 A.2d at 213.
MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-201 to 3-234 (1984).
Id. § 3-202 (1984).
Litton Bionetics, Inc. v. Glen Constr. Co., 292 Md. 34,52-53,437 A.2d 208, 217-18
(1981). The court found itself vested with the power to order the consolidation of
arbitration agreements because of the statutory jurisdiction conferred upon it by the
Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act. Id. The Uniform Act provides, in pertinent
part, that "[a]n agreement providing for arbitration under the law of the State confers jurisdiction on a court to enforce the agreement and enter judgment on an arbitration award." MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-202 (1984). The court,
however, distinguished the existence of such power from the exercise of such power.
In instances where conflicting arbitration provisions require alteration of contract
rights in order to effect consolidation, consolidation should not be ordered. The
power, however, still exists; the ultimate question is whether it should be exercised.
See Litton, 292 Md. at 52-53,437 A.2d at 217-18. The court noted that, in determining whether to exercise the power to consolidate, a court should consider the
same types of factors as those considered in determining whether to consolidate
equity actions. Id. at 55, 437 A.2d at 219.
230. Litton, 292 Md. at 39, 437 A.2d at 211.
231. Id. at 56, 437 A.2d at 219-20.
232. Id. The federal Act has been applied in at least two Maryland trial court decisions.
See Commissioners of Aberdeen v. Conoc Constr. Corp., No. 30088/37/148 (Cir.
Ct. for Harford County, Jan. 4, 1984); Saint Agnes Hosp. v. Charles J. Frank, Inc.,
No. 84039098/E16458 (Cir. Ct. for Baltimore City, Dec. 19, 1984) (Master's
Report).
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are proper subjects for judicial resolution. This posture, prescribed in
Frederick Contractors, Inc. v. Bel Pre Medical Center, Inc. and confirmed
in Gold Coast Mal/, Inc. v. Lamar Corp. stands contrary to the federal
rule announced in Moses H. Cone. Until Maryland chooses to recant the
Bel Pre rule in light of Moses H. Cone and Southland, the determination
of who decides procedural issues will be reduced to a determination of
whether the arbitration agreement is found in a "contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce."
Remaining unclear, however, is just what degree of commerce is required before the federal Act must be applied. Federal and state courts
have construed this requirement liberally, but whether these decisions
reflect Congress's true intent in enacting the Act in 1925 is unclear. Also
unclear is whether all sections, or only section 2 of the Act, apply in state
courts in transactions involving commerce.
These ambiquities burden the summary and speedy resolution of arbitrable disputes and, therefore, point to the need for legislative revision
of the Act. Failure by the legislature to address these issues will lead
parties who contracted for the settlement of disputes by arbitration into
the throes of the courtroom - the precise end arbitration is designed to
avoid.
Douglas M Fox

